From Conflicting DCA Opinions to Possible Constitutional Violations

From Conflicting DCA Opinions to Possible Constitutional Violations

In a recent Third District Court of Appeal Opinion, filed on October 14, 2026, Judge Fernandez set a precedent that directly conflicts with that of the First District Court of Appeal in Hill v. State.[i] This case is about the appeal of a trial court’s order revoking probation and subsequently sentencing the defendant to life in prison as a prison release reoffender (“PRR”).[ii]

In Scott v. State, Scott was sentenced to a five-year probation that would following a 10-year minimum sentence, leading to his release of this sentence on October 28, 2017.[iii] It is important to note that in 2008, when there were negotiations of plea deals, the State waived PRR sentencing in exchange for that plea. After the first sentencing, he continued being imprisoned because he was convicted of a concurrent crime and was released on November 3, 2022. The State concedes that after the second and official release date is when the five-year probationary period began to run. Subsequently, the State filed a probation violation affidavit on December 13, 2023. The State justified such affidavit because he qualified as a PRR in his initial convictions.

Judge Fernandez’s opinion sets a precedent that if there are concurrent sentences being served with a pending following probation period, then probation is tolled until the serving of all incarcerations, and if the defendant merely qualifies as a PRR in the initial proceedings, then that is an option the State may take once the probationary period begins.[iv] The Court reasons their toll of probationary periods by citing to Fla. Stat. §948.012(1), which states “[t]he period of probation or community control shall commence immediately upon the release of the defendant from incarceration, whether by parole or gain-time allowances.”[v] Along with the use of Lawson, which establishes that the purpose of a probation is to rehabilitate the defendant, and the prison time is for punishment, so the probation period should be tolled until after that punishment has taken place.[vi]

The court finds that if probation is revoked, which is possibly from a violation of some sort, then the court can declare the defendant guilty and impose the sentence.[vii] Thus, there is not a requirement for a jury finding because the revocation of a probation and sentencing as PRR is administerial.[viii]

Essentially, the Third District Court of Appeal states that when a defendant merely qualifies for PRR at the beginning of their sentencing, then it allows for the State to impose a life sentence if probation is revoked. Yet, it is important to note that Judge Miller states that this opinion is in direct conflict with the First District Court of Appeal decision in Hill.[ix] In Hill, there is a similar fact pattern as the defendant in this case, Scott. Although, in Hill, the Court decided that an imposition of a PRR sentence without a jury ruling is “expired” if there are no statements made at the original hearing. The First DCA ruling prohibits the State from seeking a sentence under PRR after the sentence was served.

The decision the Third District Court of Appeal made this month will trigger possible Florida Supreme Court intervention, as conflicting DCA opinions are under their discretionary authority. Here, there are possible violations of the Constitution because courts are invoking sentences without jury findings, without the determination of facts by one’s community.[x]

[i] Hill v. State, 403 So. 3d 505 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025).

[ii] Scott v. State, 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 8077, *1 (2026).

[iii] Scott v. State, 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 8077, *1 (2026).

[iv] Scott v. State, 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 8077, *1 (2026).

[v] Fla. Stat. § 948.012(1) (2007).

[vi] Lawson v. State, 969 So. 2d 222, 229 (Fla. 2007).

[vii] Fla. Stat. § 948.06(2)(b) (2024).

[viii] See Maye v. State, 368 So. 3d 531, 532 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023).

[ix] Hill, 403 So. 3d at 505.

[x] Id. at 508.