When does a barn stop being part of a farm and become something else entirely? That is the central question in Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal’s decision in Sheik Island Farm, Inc. v. Covington Farm, Inc. The court framed the issue succinctly at the outset of its opinion: “Is renting out a barn for weddings the same thing as operating a farm?”[i] The decision boiled down to the meaning of one common word – “farm” – and that determination is a factual one to be decided by a jury.

Florida’s Right to Farm Act, section 823.14, Florida Statutes, was enacted to protect legitimate agricultural operations from nuisance claims as urban development expands into rural areas. [ii] The statute generally prevents farms that comply with accepted agricultural practices from being held liable for nuisance, provided the operation has existed for more than one year and follows environmental regulations and best management practices.[iii]

The dispute in Sheik Island Farm arose between neighboring properties in Pasco County. Sheik Island Farm operated a horse-boarding business along Covington Road in Dade City. In 2016, a nearby property was purchased by James and Barbara Stalnaker, who later developed what became known as Covington Farm. Although the property was classified as agricultural for tax purposes, the Stalnakars constructed a large barn and began using the property primarily as a wedding and event venue.

Sheik Island Farm alleged that the venue created significant disturbances for its horse-boarding operation. Increased traffic, speeding vehicles, dust from the dirt road, and garbage from events interfered with the farm’s use of its property and affected the horses. The farm filed suit asserting claims for private nuisance, public nuisance, and violation of the Pasco County Land Development Code.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Covington Farm. The court reasoned that because the property had been classified as agricultural under Florida’s “greenbelt” tax statute, the Florida Right to Farm Act barred the nuisance claims and exempted the property from certain local regulations.[iv]

The Second District Court of Appeal disagreed. The court explained that the Right to Farm Act protects only properties that actually qualify as “farms” under the statute.[v] The Act defines a farm as land and facilities used in the production of farm products, which includes plants, animals, or insects useful to humans.[vi] Because the statute focuses on agricultural production, the key issue was whether Covington Farm’s property was actually being used as a farm.

Applying the plain language of the statute, the court emphasized that the key inquiry was how the property was actually being used. The record contained sufficient evidence suggesting the property functioned primarily as a commercial wedding venue rather than a farming operation. Marketing materials, tax filings, and testimony indicated that the property generated revenue through event rentals rather than agricultural production. Because a reasonable jury could conclude that the property was not operating as a farm, the court held that summary judgment was improper.

The court also rejected the trial court’s reliance on the property’s agricultural tax classification. While that designation may serve as evidence of agricultural use, it exists primarily for ad valorem tax purposes and does not automatically determine whether property qualifies as a farm under the Right to Farm Act. The statutes governing agricultural tax classification and nuisance protections serve different purposes, and one does not control the other.

The Second District ultimately reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The decision underscores that statutory protections for agriculture depend not simply on how property is labeled, but on how it is actually used.

As agritourism and rural event venues continue to expand across Florida, disputes like this one are likely to become more common. Sheik Island Farm, Inc. v. Covington Farm, Inc. signals that courts will look beyond marketing labels and tax classifications when determining whether a property qualifies for the protections of the Right to Farm Act. In other words, simply hosting events in a barn on agricultural land does not automatically transform a wedding venue into a farm.

[i] Sheik Island Farm, Inc. v. Covington Farm, Inc., No. 2D2025-0151, 2026 WL 517611, at *1 (Fla. 2d DCA Feb. 25, 2026).

[ii] Fla. Stat. § 823.14 (2022).

[iii] Fla. Stat. § 823.14(4) (2022).

[iv] Fla. Stat. § 193.461(1) (2025).

[v] Sheik Island Farm, Inc., No. 2D2025-0151, 2026 WL 517611, at *4.

[vi] Fla. Stat. § 823.14(3)(c) (2022); see Fla. Stat. § 570.86(1) (2025) (defining “agritourism activity”).

In United States v. Ragland, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether a defendant resentenced after the vacatur of a firearm conviction may benefit from the sentencing reforms enacted in the First Step Act.[i]  The case highlights how recent Supreme Court precedent continues to reshape federal sentencing law, particularly for defendants who received lengthy sentences under the former “stacking” framework of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

Michael Shane Ragland was convicted in 2009 for his role in a series of armed robberies of Florida convenience stores. A federal jury found him guilty of eighteen counts, including multiple violations of § 924(c), which criminalizes using or brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. At the time of Ragland’s sentencing, § 924(c) contained a stacking mechanism that imposed increasingly severe mandatory minimum sentences for multiple firearm convictions charged in the same indictment. After a defendant’s first § 924(c) conviction, each additional conviction carried a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years to be served consecutively. As a result of this structure, Ragland received a sentence totaling 196 years in federal prison.

In the years following his conviction, developments in Supreme Court precedent created new opportunities for defendants to challenge firearm convictions predicated on certain offenses. Ragland sought relief through a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, relying on United States v. Taylor, in which the Supreme Court held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” for purposes of § 924(c).[ii] Because one of Ragland’s firearm convictions was predicated on attempted Hobbs Act robbery, the district court vacated that count and ordered resentencing.

At resentencing, Ragland argued that the district court should apply the First Step Act of 2018.[iii]  The Act significantly altered § 924(c)’s sentencing framework by eliminating the automatic stacking of twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentences when multiple firearm charges are brought in the same case. Instead, the enhanced penalty now applies only when a defendant commits a new § 924(c) offense after a prior conviction has become final. The district court declined to apply the First Step Act and resentenced Ragland to 173 years in prison.

Ragland appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit initially affirmed the district court’s decision based on its prior precedent interpreting the First Step Act’s retroactivity. However, only two days after the panel issued its opinion, the Supreme Court decided Hewitt v. United States.[iv]  In Hewitt, the Court held that defendants who appear for sentencing after the enactment of the First Step Act, including those whose earlier sentences were vacated, are subject to the Act’s revised sentencing provisions.[v]

In light of Hewitt, the Eleventh Circuit granted Ragland’s petition for rehearing.[vi]  The court concluded that because Ragland’s sentence had been vacated and he appeared before the district court for a new sentencing proceeding, the First Step Act’s revised penalties applied. The Court therefore vacated Ragland’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing consistent with the Act.

The court also rejected Ragland’s attempt to expand his § 2255 motion to challenge additional firearm convictions. The Eleventh Circuit held that district courts lack jurisdiction to consider claims beyond those authorized by the court of appeals in a successive § 2255 motion. In doing so, the court declined to follow approaches adopted by other circuits that allow broader amendments to post-conviction petitions.

The decision in Ragland reflects the continuing impact of both legislative reform and Supreme Court intervention on federal sentencing. By applying the Supreme Court’s guidance in Hewitt, the Eleventh Circuit confirmed that defendants whose sentences are vacated and reconsidered after the First Step Act may benefit from Congress’s effort to reduce the harsh consequences of § 924(c) stacking.

[i] See United States v. Ragland, No. 23-12278, 2025 WL 1742251, 2 (11th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026).

[ii] See United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 824, 1-3 (2022).

[iii] See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221-22 (2018).

[iv] See Hewitt v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2165, 1 (2025).

[v] See First Step Act of 2018, supra note iii. 

[vi] See Hewitt, 145 S. Ct. at 2-3; see also Ragland No. 23-12278 at 1.

Recently, in City of Tampa v. Liberty Hospitality Management, LLC, Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal, discussed an unusual issue in a rezoning dispute. The question before the court was: whether a circuit court has jurisdiction to review a municipal rezoning decision when a city council acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. The answer, according to the Second District, is a resounding yes for one simple yet well-established reason, Florida’s constitutional separation-of-powers clause does not apply to local governments.[i]

The dispute arose when Liberty Hospitality Management’s attempt to rezone property on Harbour Island in Tampa to allow development of a hotel. Their objective was to increase the island’s hotel entitlements by 150 rooms and 160 parking spaces allocated to the project. After conducting a public hearing, the Tampa City Council denied the rezoning request, which resulted in Liberty seeking review in circuit court via the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the City Council’s decision.[ii]

Rather than addressing the merits of the rezoning decision, the circuit court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that because the Tampa City Council is part of the legislative branch of municipal government, it could not exercise quasi-judicial authority unless the Florida Constitution expressly allowed it. Following that reasoning, the court concluded that Florida’s separation-of-powers clause prevented the City Council from engaging in quasi-judicial decision making and therefore prevented the circuit court from reviewing the decision through certiorari.[iii]

The Second District vehemently disagreed.

Writing for the court, Judge Morris opined that the circuit court’s analysis began with a fundamentally flawed premise. Article II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution, divides the state government into legislative, executive, and judicial branches.[iv] However, Florida courts have long recognized and held that this separation-of-powers pertains to the structure of the state government, not local government entities such as counties and municipalities.

Cities, the court noted, are creatures of the state without independent sovereignty. Because of that status, the constitutional separation-of-powers framework that governs the three branches of state government does not operate at the municipal level in the same way.[v]

Once that flawed premise was removed, the rest of the circuit court’s jurisdictional reasoning collapsed.

            The Second District further explained that municipalities derive their authority from Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution, which grants cities broad home-rule powers to conduct municipal government and exercise of powers for municipal purposes unless otherwise prohibited by law.[vi] Those powers include zoning authority and the ability to conduct hearings when evaluating development and rezoning applications.

            Under well-established Florida law, site-specific zoning decisions are considered quasi-judicial rather than purely legislative. When a decision affects identifiable parties, requires a hearing, and involves applying existing policy to specific facts, the action takes on a quasi-judicial character.[vii]

            That characterization matters because quasi-judicial decisions are subject to judicial review.

            When a local government acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, its decision may be reviewed in circuit court through a petition for writ of certiorari.[viii] Certiorari review allows courts to ensure that local governments provide procedural due process and base their decisions on competent substantial evidence.

            Because the Tampa City Council’s rezoning decision fit squarely within the aforementioned parameters, the circuit court had jurisdiction to review Liberty’s petition. By refusing to exercise that jurisdiction, the circuit court committed legal error.

            The Second District therefore granted the City’s petition for mandamus and directed the circuit court to consider Liberty’s certiorari petition challenging the rezoning decision.

            For practitioners, the case highlights the continuing importance of certiorari review in Florida land use litigation. Developers, property owners, and municipalities frequently litigate zoning disputes through the use of certiorari petitions, which ensures a limited yet critical mechanism for reviewing quasi-judicial local government decisions. Without that avenue of review, parties affected by site-specific zoning determinations would have little recourse to challenge procedural errors or evidentiary deficiencies in local decision making.

            More broadly, City of Tampa serves as a reminder that constitutional doctrines designed to structure the branches of state government do not automatically translate to the operations of local government. Municipal power in Florida derives largely from home-rule powers granted by the Florida Constitution and statutes, not from the rigid separation of powers framework that governs the state’s legislative, executive, and judicial branches.

            In other words, the separation of powers structure may keep Tallahassee in check, but it does not apply to city hall.

[i] City of Tampa v. Liberty Hospitality Mgmt., LLC, No. 2D2024-2082, 2026 WL 627977, at *6 (Fla. 2d DCA March 6, 2026)

[ii] Id.

[iii] Id.

[iv] Fla. Const. art. II, §3.

[v] Fried v. State, 355 So. 3d 899, 907 (Fla. 2023).

[vi] Fla Const. art. VIII, § 2(b).

[vii] Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 474 (Fla. 1993).

[viii] Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(c).

Sometimes the interpretation of a single word can alter the course of litigation. In a recent decision involving two Florida mobile home park associations, a single article, “a,” reshaped how entire communities must pursue relief in court.[i] In Wynne Building Corporation v. Spanish Lakes Country Club Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc., the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal clarified how Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.222 governs associational class actions in mobile home parks.

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.222 was created with mobile home communities in mind.[ii] Residents in these parks typically own their homes but lease the land beneath them, meaning disputes over rent increases or shared facilities tend to affect every homeowner.[iii] Recognizing this dynamic, the rule allows a mobile homeowners’ association to bring a lawsuit in its own name on behalf of all homeowners concerning matters of common interest.[iv] Unlike traditional class actions governed by Rule 1.220, this procedure does not require the association to satisfy the full set of certification requirements. Instead, Rule 1.222 serves as a practical shortcut, providing mobile homeowners with a collective voice without the complexity of conventional class-action litigation.[v]

In Wynne, two separate homeowners’ associations representing neighboring parks—both owned by Wynne Building Corporation—filed a single joint class action challenging allegedly unreasonable rent increases over a two-year period. The trial court allowed them to proceed together under Rule 1.222. On appeal, the Fourth District reversed. The court did not decide whether the rent increases were reasonable; instead, it focused on how such challenges must be structured from the outset.

The court’s attention turned to the language of Rule 1.222. By its terms, the rule allows “[a] mobile homeowners’ association” to bring an action on behalf of its homeowners, and the majority read this phrasing literally. The singular references, along with the later use of “the association,” suggested to the court that each action must be brought by one specific association for its own members. What the court would not allow was a “class action of class actions,” a combined suit representing multiple associations together, since each association is legally distinct and represents a separate group of homeowners.[vi] In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on textualist principles, echoing reasoning from Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, emphasizing that the interpretation of a procedural rule must be faithful to the meaning the text can reasonably bear.[vii]

The ruling does not shut the door on collective action; instead, it redraws the path to get there. Associations may still pursue related claims in parallel, and their cases may ultimately proceed together. Each association must first establish independently that its claims involve matters of common interest among its own members under Rule 1.222. Only once that separate certification is complete can the trial court, exercising its broad discretion, consolidate the cases for efficiency.[viii] In reaffirming this approach, the court emphasized that judges retain “maximum discretion” in managing their dockets, enforcing precedent from Condominium Owners Organization of Century Village East, Inc. v. Century Village East, Inc.[ix] Consolidation remains an option, but it comes only after each association has cleared the initial procedural threshold.

The dissent viewed this requirement as an unnecessary procedural detour. Because the defendants’ alleged conduct and the governing legal theories were identical, it questioned whether forcing separate filings elevates form over substance. Moreover, separate commonality inquiries and layered motion practices may increase attorneys’ fees and litigation costs. Given that fee-shifting provisions often apply in mobile home park disputes, those additional expenses may ultimately fall on the losing party.

The ruling leaves substantive rights untouched. Mobile homeowners may still collectively challenge rent increases. However, the structure for bringing these cases together has shifted. Even when multiple parks confront identical rent hikes from the same owner, they must initiate separate Rule 1.222 actions before seeking consolidation. The decision illustrates how procedural language—down to “a” single article—can recalibrate leverage, timing, and cost.

Under Florida law, collective action in mobile home park disputes still exists, but it now begins one association at a time.

[i] Wynne Bldg. Corp. v. Spanish Lakes Country Club Vill. Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., No. 4D2025-2169, at 2 (Fla. 4th DCA Feb. 11, 2026) (holding that Rule 1.222 permits an action by a single association on behalf of its members but does not authorize a joint associational class action brought by multiple associations).

[ii] Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.222.

[iii] Fla. Stat. § 723.003 (2025) (defining mobile home lot tenancy).

[iv] Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.222; Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220.

[v] Id.

[vi] Condo. Owners Org. Century Village E., Inc. v. Century Village E., Inc., 428 So.2d 384, 386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (holding that an umbrella organization cannot bring a “class action of class actions” on behalf of multiple condominium associations).

[vii] Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 308 So.3d 942, 947 (Fla. 2020).

[viii] Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.270(a).

[ix] Condo. Owners Org. Century Village E., 428 So.2d at 386.

On March 11, 2026, the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida issued its per curiam opinion in Roussell v. Bank of New York Mellon, affirming the trial court’s judgment on the merits but writing separately to address a troubling issue: the appellant’s reliance on fabricated legal authority.[i] The court found that thirteen of the cases cited in the appellant’s brief did not exist and that nine additional citations, while referencing real cases, did not stand for the propositions the appellant attributed to them. The decision adds to a growing line of Florida appellate rulings confronting the consequences of artificial intelligence-generated legal research.

The underlying dispute arose from a foreclosure action brought by the Bank of New York Mellon against Samantha Roussell in Broward County’s Seventeenth Judicial Circuit. Roussell, proceeding pro se, appealed the circuit court’s ruling. In her appellate brief, however, she relied extensively on cases that the court determined were “hallucinated,” a term now widely used to describe fabricated outputs produced by generative AI tools. The Fourth DCA expressly disregarded these nonexistent authorities and affirmed the lower court’s decision without further discussion of the merits.

This decision is not the first time the Fourth DCA has addressed AI-generated citations. In Friend v. Serpa, the same court warned a pro se appellee who cited nonexistent cases that such “phantom authority” must be disregarded and that sanctions were available under the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.[ii] Earlier, in Goya v. Hayashida, the Fourth DCA found that a pro se party’s answer brief was “replete with and entirely supported by fake cases and legal propositions, presumably generated by artificial intelligence.”[iii] Taken together, these decisions reflect the Fourth DCA’s increasing frustration with litigants who submit AI-generated authority without verifying its accuracy.

The problem of AI hallucinations in legal filings extends well beyond Florida. The issue first gained national attention in 2023 when a federal judge in the Southern District of New York sanctioned two attorneys in Mata v. Avianca, Inc. for submitting a brief that cited entirely fictitious cases generated by ChatGPT.[iv] Since then, courts across the country have encountered similar filings from both attorneys and pro se litigants who failed to verify AI-generated outputs. In response, the Florida Bar issued Ethics Opinion 24-1 in January 2024, confirming that lawyers may use generative AI but emphasizing that they remain fully responsible for the accuracy and competence of all submissions to the court.[v]

What makes Roussell particularly notable is the sheer scope of the inaccurate citations. The court identified thirteen wholly fabricated cases and nine real cases cited for propositions they do not support, totaling twenty-two deficient citations in a single brief. The court emphasized that any party, whether represented by counsel or proceeding pro se, bears responsibility for the content of submissions to the court. While the panel declined to impose sanctions, it expressly noted its authority to do so under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.410(a) for noncompliance with Rule 9.210(c), which governs the content and form of appellate briefs.[vi]

For Florida practitioners, Roussell signals that the Fourth DCA’s patience with AI-fabricated authority is wearing thin. Each successive opinion, from Goya to Friend to Roussell, has included progressively sterner warnings. The court’s repeated reminders that sanctions remain available suggest that future litigants who submit hallucinated citations may not receive the same leniency. As generative AI tools become more accessible, both attorneys and self-represented parties must treat their outputs as a starting point for research, not a substitute for it. The obligation to verify every citation remains squarely on the individual who signs the brief.

[i] Roussell v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 4D2025-1309, 2026 WL 681054, at *1 (Fla. 4th DCA Mar. 11, 2026).

[ii] Friend v. Serpa, 425 So. 3d 51, 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2025).

[iii] Goya v. Hayashida, 418 So. 3d 652, 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2025).

[iv] Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

[v] Fla. Bar Ethics Op. 24-1 (Jan. 19, 2024).

[vi] Fla. R. App. P. 9.410(a); see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.210(c).

A recent Eleventh Circuit dispute addresses the ongoing tension between state immigration enforcement efforts and the federal government’s constitutional authority over immigration policy. The litigation centers on Florida’s Senate Bill 4-C (SB 4-C), a bill proposal enacted during a special legislative session that created new state crimes targeting certain undocumented immigrants who enter Florida after entering the United States without federal inspection or after prior removal.[i] Shortly after the law’s enactment, immigrant advocacy organizations and individual plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Attorney General James Uthmeier.[ii] More specifically, Florida Immigrant Coalition (FLIC) and the Farmworker Association of Florida (FWAF), along with two individuals, are the named plaintiffs in this case.[iii]

The central issue that the Eleventh Circuit will eventually decide is whether Florida’s statute intrudes upon a field that Congress has already occupied. The plaintiffs argued that SB 4-C violates the Supremacy Clause because immigration regulation falls primarily within the federal government’s authority.[iv] At the same time, Florida contends that states retain the authority to enact laws to deter unlawful entry into their territories. Plaintiffs argued that the Immigration and Nationality Act already governed as it regulated the entry, presence, and removal of noncitizens. This act leaves little room for states to create independent immigration crimes, meaning SB 4-C improperly creates a parallel state immigration offense that conflicts with the federal framework.

The Southern District Court of Florida agreed that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their constitutional claims and issued a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of the statute while the case proceeds.[v] The court concluded that the law was likely preempted by federal immigration law because Congress had already created a detailed regulatory framework governing immigration enforcement.[vi] The district court also determined that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the lawsuit because they faced a credible threat of prosecution under the statute.

Florida appealed the injunction and asked the Eleventh Circuit to stay the district court’s order.[vii] A stay would allow the state to enforce the statute while the appellate court considers whether the district court correctly blocked the law. In reviewing the request, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether Florida demonstrated a likelihood of success on appeal and whether the balance of harms favored allowing the law to take effect. The Eleventh Circuit ultimately granted the state’s request for a stay of the injunction. As a result, the district court’s order preventing enforcement of SB 4-C has been temporarily suspended while the appeal moves forward. This procedural ruling allows Florida to enforce the statute during the pendency of the appeal, though the court has not yet resolved the underlying constitutional question concerning federal preemption.

While granting the order to stay, the Eleventh Circuit expedited the case to resolve the dispute more quickly. Although the Eleventh Circuit has not yet issued a final ruling on the Senate bill, the court’s stay order provides significant insight into its intentions. For now, the statute may be enforced while the appellate court evaluates the district court’s ruling.[viii] In July 2025, the United States Supreme Court ultimately denied Florida’s request to enforce its state immigration law.[ix] There was no dissenting opinion or explanation for the denial.[x] Their decision to deny the request follows a string of other decisions on laws similar to SB 4-C.[xi]

[i] See 2025 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2025-2 (S.B. 4-C) (West).

[ii] See Florida Immigrant Coalition, et. al v. James Uthmeier, et. al, 780 F. Supp. 3d 1235, 1251 (S.D. Fla. 2025).

[iii] See Federal Court Halts Florida’s Cruel Anti-Immigrant Law SB 4-C in Major Victory for Immigrant Justice, ACLU (Apr. 4, 2025, at 6:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/federal-court-halts-floridas-cruel-anti-immigrant-law-sb-4-c-in-major-victory-for-immigrant-justice (“The court ruled that the plaintiffs — including two individuals and two grassroots membership organizations, the Florida Immigrant Coalition (FLIC) and the Farmworker Association of Florida (FWAF) — are likely to succeed in showing that SB 4-C is unconstitutional.”).

[iv] See Florida Immigrant Coalition v. Uthmeier, ACLU (July 16, 2025), https://www.aclu.org/cases/florida-immigrant-coalition-v-uthmeier (“The court explained that ‘[i]t seems likely—given the federal government’s longstanding and distinct interest in’ immigration and Congress’s “extensive regulation” in this area—that SB 4C is preempted by federal law.”).

[v] See Federal Court Halts Florida’s Cruel Anti-Immigrant Law SB 4-C in Major Victory for Immigrant Justice, supra note iii.

[vi] See id.

[vii] See Florida Immigrant Coalition v. Uthmeier, supra note iv.

[viii] See id.

[ix] See U.S. Supreme Court Denies Florida’s Request to Enforce Unconstitutional Anti-Immigrant Law, ACLUFL (July 9, 2025, at 5:12 PM), https://www.aclufl.org/press-releases/u-s-supreme-court-denies-floridas-request-to-enforce-unconstitutional-anti-immigrant-law/.

[x] See id.

[xi] See id.