Moot Court Mondays | St. Thomas College of Law Moot Courtroom

Authenticating AI Evidence in Florida: Closing the Gaps

by Karem M. Cortez | Nov 10, 2025 | Moot Court Mondays

Authentication is the foundation of admissibility. Under § 90.901, evidence must be authenticated or identified before it can be admitted, a requirement satisfied by showing enough proof that the evidence is what the proponent claims it to be.[i] In Florida, this threshold is relatively low. Courts allow authentication through a variety of means, including appearance, content, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, either supported by extrinsic proof or through self-authentication. However, the rise of artificial intelligence (“AI”) poses new challenges to this framework. AI-generated content can appear highly convincing while bearing no connection to reality. Without stronger safeguards, courts risk admitting unreliable AI-based evidence that slips through under the current low bar.

Florida courts are finding ways to deal with digital evidence by adapting old rules to new technology, but they also make sure not to weaken important protections like authentication, privacy, and fairness in the process. Florida’s Evidence Code § 90.901 requires that evidence be supported by proof sufficient to show that it is what its proponent claims, and courts have applied this requirement with notable flexibility. In Lamb v. State, the Fourth DCA upheld the admission of a Facebook Live video authenticated through forensic testimony, reflecting the judiciary’s willingness to admit digital content when properly connected to its source.[ii] Similarly, in Tracey v. State, the Florida Supreme Court required warrants for cell-site location data, adapting constitutional protections to the realities of digital surveillance.[iii]Additionally, in Wilsonart, LLC v. Lopez, while the Court declined to create a narrow exception for video evidence, it signaled its intent to adopt the federal Celotex summary judgment standard.[iv] An intent later formalized in the amendment of Rule 1.510, reshaped Florida’s summary judgment practice giving judges greater authority to grant judgment when one side has no real evidence.[v] Taken together, these decisions illustrate how Florida courts balance adaptability with restraint, extending established doctrines to address digital evidence without undermining the foundational protections of authentication, privacy, and procedural fairness.

Even with safeguards, authentication is vulnerable. Parties are not required to disclose whether evidence is AI generated and contextual markers like metadata can be fabricated. Proprietary algorithms may avoid Daubert review if methods are withheld (e.g., facial recognition software). Unlike federal courts, Florida lacks self-authentication rules for electronic records, forcing reliance on live testimony for even routine digital files.[vi]

The judiciary has already flagged AI concerns. In 2023, the Office of the State Courts Administrator warned that deepfakes and synthetic media could strain authentication standards. Florida’s 2025 procedural reforms, such as proportional discovery[vii], revised summary-judgment timelines[viii], and the Supreme Court’s ongoing review of Evidence Code amendments (SC2025-0659) create an opening to confront AI’s impact directly.[ix]

Florida can act before AI evidence overwhelms its courts. While Florida Statute § 90.901, Daubert, and contextual proof offer a baseline, stricter disclosure and reliability rules in the pending Evidence Code amendments are needed to keep synthetic evidence out of the record.

[i] Fla. Stat. § 90.901 (2025).

[ii] Lamb v. State, 246 So. 3d 400, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).

[iii] Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2014).

[iv] Wilsonart, LLC v. Lopez, 308 So. 3d 961 (Fla. 2020); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).

[v] See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510 (2025).

[vi] See Fed. R. Evid. 902(13)–(14); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (allowing judges act as evidentiary gatekeepers grounded in scientifically valid methodology as demonstrated through factors like testability, peer review, error rates, standards, and general acceptance).

[vii] Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280 (2025)

[viii] Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510 (2025)

[ix] In re Amends. to the Fla. Evidence Code § 90.404(2)(c), No. SC2025-0659 (proposed Apr. 2025).

Prospective Plaintiff Denied Pursuant to Florida Pre-Suit Requirements Under Chapter 766 in Recent District Court of Appeals Decision

by Lucia Vieites | Nov 3, 2025 | Moot Court Mondays

One detail missed, several lives affected. Despite the harm that can result from medical misconduct, it is not as easy for prospective plaintiffs to file a medical negligence claim. First, a claimant must complete an adequate pre-suit investigation prior to filing the complaint in Court. The statutory safeguard confirms the prospective plaintiff’s claim is supported by reasonable grounds. The required investigation includes: (1) a notice of intent to initiate litigation; and (2) a corroborating affidavit written by a medical expert in a similar field as the defendant health care provider.

In a recent case, the Fourth District Court of Appeals opined that a proper corroborating affidavit is a “low bar.”[i]As such, the penalties for failing to conduct an adequate pre-suit investigation have severe consequences commanded by the statute. The court shall dismiss the claim if the notice of intent to initiate litigation is inadequate.[ii] Additionally, the person who mailed such notice, either the claimant or the claimant’s attorney, would be personally liable for all attorneys’ fees and costs incurred during the investigation and evaluation of the claim. A motion to dismiss would raise the issue of whether the corroborating affidavit is sufficient for a legitimate claim of medical negligence.[iii]

In Potapric v. Barnes, the Court dismissed a medical negligence claim for failing to comply with the statutory pre-suit requirements.[iv] Following alleged post-surgical complications, Barnes sued Dr. Potparic for medical negligence. Barnes’ expert affidavit stated Potparic violated the medical standard of care by performing the surgery while not properly registered with the Florida Department of Health. The affidavit mentioned a breach also where the nurse administered anesthesia while the supervising doctor was not properly registered. Discovery later revealed that Potparic was properly registered at the time of the surgery, and Barnes sought leave to file a second amended complaint. Barnes now alleged she was harmed because the nurse who administered the anesthesia was not properly registered with the Department of Health. However, Barnes did not submit a new affidavit with the second amended complaint. The affidavit did not mention the nurse’s own registration or describe any deficient act or how such act caused Barnes to have any injury.

The court looked at whether the notice of intent to initiate litigation and the corroborating expert opinion, taken together sufficiently indicated that Dr. Potparic allegedly deviated from the standard of care, and if Barnes provided adequate information for the defendants to evaluate the merits of the claim.[v] The Court agreed with Potparic that the affidavit does not corroborate reasonable grounds to support the claim of medical negligence set out in the second amended complaint. The only theory of negligence described in the claimant’s expert’s affidavit proved unfounded and was abandoned. The affidavit lent no support to the claim alleged in Barnes’s second amended complaint. Because Barnes failed to comply with the procedural requirements, the Court quashed the order denying dismissal with directions to grant the dismissal as commanded by statute. Along with dismissal, either Barnes or her attorney will be personally liable for the attorney’s fees and costs associated with investigating this claim.[vi]

While the District Court opinion did not reach the issue of consequences for failing to conduct a reasonable investigation, the statute commands liability for attorney’s fees and costs and disciplinary review with the Florida Bar.[vii]

[i] Potparic v. Barnes, No. 4D2025-1701, 2025 Fla. App. LEXIS 7301, at *6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sep. 24, 2025).

[ii] Fla. Stat. § 766.206(2) (2025).

[iii] Id.

[iv] Potparic v. Barnes, No. 4D2025-1701, 2025 Fla. App. LEXIS 7301, at *6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sep. 24, 2025).

[v] Id. at *5.

[vi] See Fla. Stat. §766.206(2)(2025).

[vii] Fla. Stat. § 766.206 (4).

Upon Deaf Ears: Understanding 3M’s Invocation of the Government-Contractor Defense

by Michael Mejia | Mar 29, 2022 | Moot Court Mondays

3M corporation, long a staple of American industry, has recently been rocked by a string of lawsuits related to defective earplugs it sold to the U.S. military in what has been termed the largest multi-district litigation in U.S. history.1 As of the writing of this article, plaintiffs (all former U.S. military veterans have been awarded a staggering combined amount of $160 million in six bellwether trials.2 The entire controversy stems from 3M’s 2008 acquisition of Aearo Technologies, the company which manufactured the earplugs.3 The reason Aearo’s design of earplugs appealed to the U.S. military resulted from its innovative design: the dual-ended design allowed one end to block out as much sound as possible while the other end protected a user’s ears from extremely loud noises such as gunfire or explosions.4 This design was advantageous because it allowed troops to communicate with fellow soldiers nearby during loud situations.5

In a recent filing, 3M sought to appeal its first trial loss in the massive multi-district litigation. In its appeal before the Eleventh Circuit, the company’s lawyers sought to invoke a legal doctrine known as the government-contractor defense.6 Essentially, the company argued that this federal doctrine preempted the plaintiff’s state law claims of product defect and failure to warn.7 The defense has its roots in the concept of sovereign immunity.8 The essential elements for this defense were resolved in the case of Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. pursuant to a split among the circuits.9 Based upon the rule articulated in Boyle, 3M would have to prove the following elements in order to avoid liability: (1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications [of the product’s design]; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier (3M) warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States. 10 Invocation of this defense may signal a strategic shift in how 3M handles the flurry of litigation that has arisen from this tragic issue. Either way, this recent filing could set the stage for the mountain of other cases the embattled conglomerate is confronted with.

1 Brooke Sutherland, 3M Adds Another Legal Worry to Its Pile of Headaches, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 14, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-02-14/3m-adds-an-earplug-legal-worry-to-its-pile-of-headaches. 2 Nate Raymond, 3M on appeal says first trial in massive earplug litigation went ‘off the rails,’ REUTERS, Feb. 25, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/3m-appeal-says-first-trial-massive-earplug-litigation-went-off-rails- 2022-02-25/.
3 Supra note 1.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Steven Brian Loy, NOTE: The Government Contractor Defense: Is It a Weapon Only for the Military?, 83 Ky. L.J. 505, 506.
9 Id.
10 Id.

To Die in A Pastor’s Arms

by Daysi Vega-Mendez | Mar 29, 2022 | Moot Court Mondays

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000, provides that no substantial burden can be imposes on the religious exercise of a person, including state prisoners, unless the imposed burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. However, RLUIPA only protects a prisoner’s requested accommodation when it is sincerely based on a religious belief and not some other motivation.

In a recent Supreme Court decision, Ramirez v. Collier Executive Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, et al., the court determined whether Ramirez’s execution should be halted until his requests for his execution were considered. Ramirez wanted his pastor to come inside the execution room with him, lay hands on him, and pray over him. The Court considered similar cases in 2020 and 2021, holding that executions could not proceed unless the inmates’ spiritual advisors were allowed to be present. The Ramiez case differs in that Ramirez requested his pastor’s physical touch.

Texas claimed two compelling interests in denying Ramirez’s request for his pastor to pray with him: (1) that absolute silence was necessary in order for proper monitoring of the inmate’s condition and (2) that the spiritual advisor could choose to make a statement to the witnesses or the personnel in the execution room, instead of to the inmate. Although the justices recognized that these interests were compelling, the majority was not persuaded that the state’s policy was the least restrictive means of protecting these interests. The court went through the long history of having audible prayer at a prisoner’s execution, making note of the fact that religious advisors were allowed to speak or pray audibly during at least six federal executions between 2020-2021. The court further recognized some lesser restrictions on audible prayer that could be adopted in furtherance of the state’s claimed interests, such as limiting the volume of prayer or requiring silence during certain moments of the process.

The state asserted three interests in banning religious touch in the execution chamber: (1) the spiritual advisor would be placed in harm’s way in the event that the inmate escapes or biomes violent, (2) the spiritual advisor might interfere with an IV line and cause more suffering to the inmate in their final moments, and (3) the victim’s family would be traumatized because their loved one did not receive the same. Again, the Court acknowledged the validity of maintaining safety and decorum in the chamber as a compelling governmental interest. But, the Court made notice of Texas’s policy of allowing spiritual advisors to be three feet from the gurney and failed to see how allowing the advisor to simply reach out their hand to touch the inmate would increase any risk of danger.

Because the state failed to meet its burden, the Court determined that it was likely that Ramirez would succeed in an RLUIPA claim and remanded the case.

Links

Google v. Oracle Ruling Could Change Software Development Forever

by Liz Guinan | Mar 7, 2022 | Moot Court Mondays

Android, built on Java software code, provides power to a majority of the mobile devices in the world. Android was developed and run by technology super house Google. Google states that they used elements of this Java code for operations. This methodology, originally spun by the technology giant Oracle, led to a public feud in 2011. Oracle claimed Google had copyrighted exact lines of a Java code they had created to complete their technology development. Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021).

The case is marked by several flip-flopping verdicts and has left some loose ends. Judge Alsup in 2012 gave a ruling that APIs are not subject to copyright law. In 2014, the Federal Circuit reversed that decision and put forth a new ruling that Java code is copyrightable. However, the floor was open for Google to present a defense. Google appealed in 2018 with Oracle, initially seeking close to ten billion dollars in damages. That number soon renewed to closer to $30 billion. Oracle’s suit claims that Google copied lines of Java programming code and used that code directly from Android. Oracle and Google’s main areas of dispute were surrounding fair use. The Supreme Court began hearing oral arguments in 2020.

They reviewed the documents and verdicts presented that led to the decisions passed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for The Federal Circuit. The Court went over four key aspects to determine whether or not the copying of API was fair use. These aspects could be found in the Copyright Act’s fair use section. These guiding factors on fair use included the purpose of the use, the nature of the work, the effect on the market, and the amount of the portion used. After over a decade of dispute, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Google, deciding that the technology giant did not commit copyright infringement when developing Android. In this 6-2 vote with Justice Breyer preceding, the case was considered an example of fair use.

Justices were concerned that a ruling in favor of Oracle could lead to monopolization. When in discussion, the Justices expressed that they understood the more profound importance of Software creation and the capabilities of Java. “There are a thousand ways of organizing things, which the first person who developed them, you’re saying, could have a copyright and prevent anybody else from using them,” Chief Justice Roberts had stated. Software creators that have developed technology will not be able to hold a monopoly over the technology, meaning that it will be available for use by other companies, programmers, and developers.

The Supreme Court ruling in favor of Google, Inc. on the primary means of creative technological freedom could open new doors for other companies to do the same. The technology industry has supported the decision, noting that it now allows companies and developers to extend the fair use of computer code. Developers who wish to have more creative liberty without facing legal repercussions may have more creative freedom that will benefit consumers.

Sources:

https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/18-956

https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id3df6529961311ebbb10beece37c6119/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0

https://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-property/100820-justices-display-concern-about-monopolization-disruption-in-google-v-oracle-oral-argument/

When the Court gives you the Lemon Test, Make a Lemon Aid?

by Ricardo Jerome | Mar 1, 2022 | Moot Court Mondays

The Establishment Clause is a clause that comes from the First Amendment of the United States. The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”.[1]

In a recent Supreme Court decision, Town of Greece v. Galloway, it highlights the struggle between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, which embodies the issues most justices have struggled to come to terms with: whether the law is promoting a religious affiliation, whether the law is infringing on religious beliefs, and where to draw the line when deciding how Establishment Clause violations should be tested. The central question in the case was whether a town in New York called Greece, was in violation of the Establishment clause by allowing town meetings to hold prayers which respondents claimed to favor the Christian religion. There was never any reviews of the prayers that were given in these town meetings due to the belief that trying to exercise any control of these prayers would violate the free exercise and free speech rights that the minister had as they would give these prayers.[2] Eventually, there were several citizens who filed a suit against these prayers claiming the Establishment Clause was being violated because they felt that the Christian faith was being favored over other faiths in the prayers.[3] In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the court ruled that these prayers which were invocated in the meetings were not unconstitutional and relied on the fact that these so called legislative prayers were ongoing and uninterrupted for years before there was any claim against them. Town of Greece v. Galloway in essence relied on a historical analysis to determine that the Establishment Clause was not being violated by the town. This is not truly a standard held by the Lemon Test which is the widely held Establishment Clause test. It is a three-prong test meant to prove that law or legislation violates the Establishment clause if it does not have a secular legislative purpose, if its primary effect advances or inhibits religion, and if it fosters excessive government entanglement with religion. Town of Greece v. Galloway begs the question of whether a historical use of specific religious practices in certain areas should be analyzed while applying the Lemon Test as an aid to determine whether there has been a violation.

[1] See U.S. CONST. amend. I.

[2] See Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 571 (2014).

[3] See Town of Greece, N.Y, 572 U.S. at 565 (stating “respondents, citizens who attend meetings to speak on local issues, filed suit, alleging that the town violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause by preferring Christians over other prayer givers and by sponsoring sectarian prayers.”).

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