On March 11, 2026, the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida issued its per curiam opinion in Roussell v. Bank of New York Mellon, affirming the trial court’s judgment on the merits but writing separately to address a troubling issue: the appellant’s reliance on fabricated legal authority.[i] The court found that thirteen of the cases cited in the appellant’s brief did not exist and that nine additional citations, while referencing real cases, did not stand for the propositions the appellant attributed to them. The decision adds to a growing line of Florida appellate rulings confronting the consequences of artificial intelligence-generated legal research.

The underlying dispute arose from a foreclosure action brought by the Bank of New York Mellon against Samantha Roussell in Broward County’s Seventeenth Judicial Circuit. Roussell, proceeding pro se, appealed the circuit court’s ruling. In her appellate brief, however, she relied extensively on cases that the court determined were “hallucinated,” a term now widely used to describe fabricated outputs produced by generative AI tools. The Fourth DCA expressly disregarded these nonexistent authorities and affirmed the lower court’s decision without further discussion of the merits.

This decision is not the first time the Fourth DCA has addressed AI-generated citations. In Friend v. Serpa, the same court warned a pro se appellee who cited nonexistent cases that such “phantom authority” must be disregarded and that sanctions were available under the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.[ii] Earlier, in Goya v. Hayashida, the Fourth DCA found that a pro se party’s answer brief was “replete with and entirely supported by fake cases and legal propositions, presumably generated by artificial intelligence.”[iii] Taken together, these decisions reflect the Fourth DCA’s increasing frustration with litigants who submit AI-generated authority without verifying its accuracy.

The problem of AI hallucinations in legal filings extends well beyond Florida. The issue first gained national attention in 2023 when a federal judge in the Southern District of New York sanctioned two attorneys in Mata v. Avianca, Inc. for submitting a brief that cited entirely fictitious cases generated by ChatGPT.[iv] Since then, courts across the country have encountered similar filings from both attorneys and pro se litigants who failed to verify AI-generated outputs. In response, the Florida Bar issued Ethics Opinion 24-1 in January 2024, confirming that lawyers may use generative AI but emphasizing that they remain fully responsible for the accuracy and competence of all submissions to the court.[v]

What makes Roussell particularly notable is the sheer scope of the inaccurate citations. The court identified thirteen wholly fabricated cases and nine real cases cited for propositions they do not support, totaling twenty-two deficient citations in a single brief. The court emphasized that any party, whether represented by counsel or proceeding pro se, bears responsibility for the content of submissions to the court. While the panel declined to impose sanctions, it expressly noted its authority to do so under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.410(a) for noncompliance with Rule 9.210(c), which governs the content and form of appellate briefs.[vi]

For Florida practitioners, Roussell signals that the Fourth DCA’s patience with AI-fabricated authority is wearing thin. Each successive opinion, from Goya to Friend to Roussell, has included progressively sterner warnings. The court’s repeated reminders that sanctions remain available suggest that future litigants who submit hallucinated citations may not receive the same leniency. As generative AI tools become more accessible, both attorneys and self-represented parties must treat their outputs as a starting point for research, not a substitute for it. The obligation to verify every citation remains squarely on the individual who signs the brief.

[i] Roussell v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 4D2025-1309, 2026 WL 681054, at *1 (Fla. 4th DCA Mar. 11, 2026).

[ii] Friend v. Serpa, 425 So. 3d 51, 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2025).

[iii] Goya v. Hayashida, 418 So. 3d 652, 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2025).

[iv] Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

[v] Fla. Bar Ethics Op. 24-1 (Jan. 19, 2024).

[vi] Fla. R. App. P. 9.410(a); see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.210(c).

A recent Eleventh Circuit dispute addresses the ongoing tension between state immigration enforcement efforts and the federal government’s constitutional authority over immigration policy. The litigation centers on Florida’s Senate Bill 4-C (SB 4-C), a bill proposal enacted during a special legislative session that created new state crimes targeting certain undocumented immigrants who enter Florida after entering the United States without federal inspection or after prior removal.[i] Shortly after the law’s enactment, immigrant advocacy organizations and individual plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Attorney General James Uthmeier.[ii] More specifically, Florida Immigrant Coalition (FLIC) and the Farmworker Association of Florida (FWAF), along with two individuals, are the named plaintiffs in this case.[iii]

The central issue that the Eleventh Circuit will eventually decide is whether Florida’s statute intrudes upon a field that Congress has already occupied. The plaintiffs argued that SB 4-C violates the Supremacy Clause because immigration regulation falls primarily within the federal government’s authority.[iv] At the same time, Florida contends that states retain the authority to enact laws to deter unlawful entry into their territories. Plaintiffs argued that the Immigration and Nationality Act already governed as it regulated the entry, presence, and removal of noncitizens. This act leaves little room for states to create independent immigration crimes, meaning SB 4-C improperly creates a parallel state immigration offense that conflicts with the federal framework.

The Southern District Court of Florida agreed that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their constitutional claims and issued a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of the statute while the case proceeds.[v] The court concluded that the law was likely preempted by federal immigration law because Congress had already created a detailed regulatory framework governing immigration enforcement.[vi] The district court also determined that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the lawsuit because they faced a credible threat of prosecution under the statute.

Florida appealed the injunction and asked the Eleventh Circuit to stay the district court’s order.[vii] A stay would allow the state to enforce the statute while the appellate court considers whether the district court correctly blocked the law. In reviewing the request, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether Florida demonstrated a likelihood of success on appeal and whether the balance of harms favored allowing the law to take effect. The Eleventh Circuit ultimately granted the state’s request for a stay of the injunction. As a result, the district court’s order preventing enforcement of SB 4-C has been temporarily suspended while the appeal moves forward. This procedural ruling allows Florida to enforce the statute during the pendency of the appeal, though the court has not yet resolved the underlying constitutional question concerning federal preemption.

While granting the order to stay, the Eleventh Circuit expedited the case to resolve the dispute more quickly. Although the Eleventh Circuit has not yet issued a final ruling on the Senate bill, the court’s stay order provides significant insight into its intentions. For now, the statute may be enforced while the appellate court evaluates the district court’s ruling.[viii] In July 2025, the United States Supreme Court ultimately denied Florida’s request to enforce its state immigration law.[ix] There was no dissenting opinion or explanation for the denial.[x] Their decision to deny the request follows a string of other decisions on laws similar to SB 4-C.[xi]

[i] See 2025 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2025-2 (S.B. 4-C) (West).

[ii] See Florida Immigrant Coalition, et. al v. James Uthmeier, et. al, 780 F. Supp. 3d 1235, 1251 (S.D. Fla. 2025).

[iii] See Federal Court Halts Florida’s Cruel Anti-Immigrant Law SB 4-C in Major Victory for Immigrant Justice, ACLU (Apr. 4, 2025, at 6:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/federal-court-halts-floridas-cruel-anti-immigrant-law-sb-4-c-in-major-victory-for-immigrant-justice (“The court ruled that the plaintiffs — including two individuals and two grassroots membership organizations, the Florida Immigrant Coalition (FLIC) and the Farmworker Association of Florida (FWAF) — are likely to succeed in showing that SB 4-C is unconstitutional.”).

[iv] See Florida Immigrant Coalition v. Uthmeier, ACLU (July 16, 2025), https://www.aclu.org/cases/florida-immigrant-coalition-v-uthmeier (“The court explained that ‘[i]t seems likely—given the federal government’s longstanding and distinct interest in’ immigration and Congress’s “extensive regulation” in this area—that SB 4C is preempted by federal law.”).

[v] See Federal Court Halts Florida’s Cruel Anti-Immigrant Law SB 4-C in Major Victory for Immigrant Justice, supra note iii.

[vi] See id.

[vii] See Florida Immigrant Coalition v. Uthmeier, supra note iv.

[viii] See id.

[ix] See U.S. Supreme Court Denies Florida’s Request to Enforce Unconstitutional Anti-Immigrant Law, ACLUFL (July 9, 2025, at 5:12 PM), https://www.aclufl.org/press-releases/u-s-supreme-court-denies-floridas-request-to-enforce-unconstitutional-anti-immigrant-law/.

[x] See id.

[xi] See id.

In Brown v. Fla. Health Sci. Ctr., Inc., the Second District Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by not recognizing there were factual disputes that precluded summary judgment.[i] The trial court granted summary judgment to the respondent, Tampa General Hospital (TGH), because it found that petitioner Valerie Brown was a trespasser and therefore was not owed a duty of care by the hospital. [ii]

As Ms. Brown was bending over her father’s hospital bed, saying goodbye, all she remembers is being hit by the psychiatric patient who was sharing a room with her father.[iii] Ms. Brown was visiting her father, who was recovering from spinal surgery at TGH. The hospital placed a psychiatric patient, exhibiting hallucinations, agitation, erratic behavior, and noncompliance, in the same room as Ms. Brown’s father.[iv] The psychiatric patient repeatedly left his bed, ripped out his IV, and told staff that he was an emperor while jumping up and down on the bed.[v]  The psychiatric patient also screamed for Ms. Brown and her father to look at a dragon outside.[vi] He then ran out of the room and through the hallway, screaming, “fire!”[vii] The hospital staff also caught him wandering the halls, saying that he was looking for the “professor.”[viii] During this time, Ms. Brown’s father was bed-bound because of his spinal surgery, which caused Ms. Brown to be in fear for her father’s safety. She repeatedly expressed concerns to nurses, who refused to move either patient.[ix]

It is surprising that the trial court agreed with TGH that Ms. Brown was a trespasser, given that visitors are almost as vital to a hospital as its patients. When visiting someone in the hospital, the visitor is usually there because something medically serious has occurred. In the middle of the night, the visitor is there to offer support, love, prayer, and perhaps to crack a joke in an otherwise solemn setting. The visitor may have never been to a hospital before and could be scared by what they see: people being rolled around on beds, connected to tubes, rushing doctors, and crash carts whizzing by. Altogether, not a place that people choose to go on their day off. That being the case, a visitor is owed a standard duty of care as an invitee, not a trespasser. Visitors come bearing flowers, fruit baskets, balloons, get-well cards, and platters of food. If visitors were labeled as trespassers, it could negatively affect some very impactful people.

The trial court agreed with TGH’s position that because it was after visiting hours, Ms. Brown was a trespasser[x]. An invitee may become a trespasser “after the expiration of a reasonable time within which to accomplish the purpose for which [s]he is invited to enter, or to remain.”[xi] Ms. Brown’s status as a trespasser or invitee is bound up with material factual issues appropriate for jury resolution.[xii] Assuming that Ms. Brown was an invitee, we note that a property owner owes an invitee “the duty ‘to use reasonable care in maintaining property in a reasonably safe condition.’”[xiii] It’s clear that in this case, not only did the hospital have notice of the increasingly erratic behavior, but they acted with apathy towards Ms. Brown’s concerns. As a visitor, the hospital owed her a duty to ensure the conditions in which her father was being cared for were adequate.

The Second District Court of Appeals rightfully reversed the summary judgment and remanded the matter to the finder of fact. Whether Ms. Brown was a trespasser and whether the hospital owed her a duty of care are unresolved factual issues that preclude summary judgment for TGH and are better left to the jury.

[i] Brown v. Fla. Health Sci. Ctr., Inc., 51 Fla. L. Weekly 203 (Dist. Ct. App. 2026).

[ii] Id. at 12.

[iii] Id. at 4.

[iv] Id. at 1.

[v] Id. at 2.

[vi] Id. at 3.

[vii] Id.

[viii] Id. at 2.

[ix] Id.

[x] Id. at 6.

[xi] Byers v. Radiant Grp., L.L.C., 966 So. 2d 506, 509 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 61 at 425).

[xii] Brown v. Fla. Health Sci. Ctr., Inc., 51 Fla. L. Weekly 203, 9 (Dist. Ct. App. 2026).

[xiii] Ruiz v. Wendy’s Trucking, LLC, 357 So. 3d 292, 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023).

One credential quietly determined whether a law graduate could even attempt to become a Florida lawyer: graduate from a law school accredited by the American Bar Association (“ABA”). In April 1950, the Florida Supreme Court created the Florida Bar, uniting all licensed attorneys in the state into one organization, responsible for regulations.[i] The Florida Supreme Court’s order shifted the responsibility of disciplinary actions from local state attorneys to a Board of Governors consisting of fourteen special committees.[ii] In 1992, the ABA became the sole law school accreditor recognized in the Court, and the rules have relied on this accreditation since 1955.[iii] Due to the integration, rule 4-13.2 established that “an accredited law school is one approved or provisionally approved by the ABA at the time of, or within twelve months of, the applicant’s graduation.”[iv]

This requirement changed in January 2026, when the Florida Supreme Court amended its bar admission rules to end the ABA’s status as the sole accrediting gatekeeper.[v] The decision came after the Court appointed a workgroup to inquire on the issue in March 2025.[vi] Thus, based on that study, the Court decided it was not in Florida’s best interest for the ABA to continue to monopolize who is allowed to sit for the Bar Exam to earn their license to practice.[vii]

Under the amended rules, it “. . . promote[s] access to high-quality, affordable legal education in law schools that are committed to the free exchange of ideas and to the principle of nondiscrimination.”[viii] Florida continues to recognize graduates of ABA-accredited schools, but it also allows graduates of law schools accredited by other entities. The decision was possible because it was within the Court’s constitutional authority, “[t]he supreme court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted.”[ix] The decision raises an important question for the legal profession: whether expanding accreditation pathways will meaningfully improve access to legal education without sacrificing quality? This decision reflects a deliberate move away from a single national standard toward a more flexible regulatory framework.

The opinion emphasizes that this change is not a rejection of ABA-accreditation, rather, the Court frames its decision as a recalibration of authority. The new framework expands the definition of “accredited” to no longer exclusively correlate to the ABA.[x] The expanding on the amendment has two separate frameworks. First, it allows accreditation by any “programmatic accrediting agency recognized by the United States Department of Education to accredit programs in legal education that lead to the first professional degree in law.”[xi] Which is currently a category that only includes the ABA. Second, it permits accreditation by institutional accrediting agencies, provided those agencies are both federally recognized and approved by the Court.[xii] The latter option gives Florida the ability to impose its own conditions focused on outcomes, such as bar passage rates, employment disclosures, and curricular standards.[xiii]

For instance, the majority’s reasoning reflects concern about cost and access. Law school tuition is constantly increasing, and critics of the ABA accreditation process have long argued that compliance costs contribute to rising student debt. The United States Federal Trade Commission has called out the ABA for being a monopoly because it has increased the cost of earning a law degree, hindering the reservoir of new lawyers.[xiv] The ABA has historically been the only recognized law school accreditation in the nation, allowing for there to be only one distinct policy to adhere to.

However, Justice Labarga’s dissent highlights the risks inherent in departing from such a long-standing system.[xv] He emphasizes that the ABA has served as Florida’s sole accreditor since 1992 and has developed extensive expertise in evaluating legal education quality.[xvi] Justice Labarga also argues that the ABA standards provide consumer protection, transparency, and institutional accountability, features that may take years for any alternative accreditor to replicate.[xvii] The history behind the organization is a rather strong front, and this change will most likely not immediately pan out.

Nevertheless, the Court’s decision does not immediately transform Florida’s legal educational environment as the amendments take effect on October 1, 2026. Graduates of ABA-accredited schools remain fully eligible to sit for the Bar; the ruling creates a potential change rather than an immediate one, allowing for the proper development of the amendments. Whether this shift ultimately benefits aspiring lawyers and the public will depend on implementation. Texas and Florida stand as the catalysts for this movement, which can possibly lead to the erasure of the ABA’s monopoly on the law school atmosphere.

[i] Mark D. Killian & Samadhi Jones, The Florida Bar Timeline 1950–2025, Fla. Bar (Sep. 8, 2025), https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-news/the-florida-bar-timeline-1950-2025 (“In April 1950, the Florida Supreme Court entered an order officially creating The Florida Bar as an integrated (mandatory) bar, uniting all licensed attorneys in the state into a single professional organization responsible for regulating the practice of law.”).

[ii] Id.

[iii] See In Re Amends. to Rules Regulating Fla. Bar & Rules of Sup. Ct. Relating to Admissions to Bar, 51 Fla. L. Weekly 25 (2026).

[iv] Id.

[v] See id.; see also Liv Caputo, Florida Supreme Court Ends Three-Decade Reliance on ABA, Handing Win to DeSantis, Fla. Phoenix (Jan. 15, 2026, at 12:43 PM), https://floridaphoenix.com/2026/01/15/florida-supreme-court-ends-three-decade-reliance-on-aba-handing-win-to-desantis/.

[vi] See In Re Amends. to Rules Regulating Fla. Bar & Rules of Sup. Ct. Relating to Admissions to Bar, supra note iii.

[vii] See id.

[viii] Id.

[ix] Fla. Const. art. V, § 15.

[x] In Re Amends. to Rules Regulating Fla. Bar & Rules of Sup. Ct. Relating to Admissions to Bar, supra note iii.

[xi] Id.

[xii] Id.

[xiii] See id.

[xiv] See Chris Williams, FTC Blames High Law School Costs on ABA Accreditation, Above Law (Dec. 3, 2025, at 4:55 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2025/12/ftc-blames-high-law-school-costs-on-aba-accreditation/.

[xv] See In Re Amends. to Rules Regulating Fla. Bar & Rules of Sup. Ct. Relating to Admissions to Bar, 51 Fla. L. Weekly 25 (2026) (Labarga, J., dissenting).

[xvi] See id.

[xvii] Id.