Breaking Chains on Bar Access: Florida Supreme Court Ends ABA Monopoly

Breaking Chains on Bar Access: Florida Supreme Court Ends ABA Monopoly

One credential quietly determined whether a law graduate could even attempt to become a Florida lawyer: graduate from a law school accredited by the American Bar Association (“ABA”). In April 1950, the Florida Supreme Court created the Florida Bar, uniting all licensed attorneys in the state into one organization, responsible for regulations.[i] The Florida Supreme Court’s order shifted the responsibility of disciplinary actions from local state attorneys to a Board of Governors consisting of fourteen special committees.[ii] In 1992, the ABA became the sole law school accreditor recognized in the Court, and the rules have relied on this accreditation since 1955.[iii] Due to the integration, rule 4-13.2 established that “an accredited law school is one approved or provisionally approved by the ABA at the time of, or within twelve months of, the applicant’s graduation.”[iv]

This requirement changed in January 2026, when the Florida Supreme Court amended its bar admission rules to end the ABA’s status as the sole accrediting gatekeeper.[v] The decision came after the Court appointed a workgroup to inquire on the issue in March 2025.[vi] Thus, based on that study, the Court decided it was not in Florida’s best interest for the ABA to continue to monopolize who is allowed to sit for the Bar Exam to earn their license to practice.[vii]

Under the amended rules, it “. . . promote[s] access to high-quality, affordable legal education in law schools that are committed to the free exchange of ideas and to the principle of nondiscrimination.”[viii] Florida continues to recognize graduates of ABA-accredited schools, but it also allows graduates of law schools accredited by other entities. The decision was possible because it was within the Court’s constitutional authority, “[t]he supreme court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted.”[ix] The decision raises an important question for the legal profession: whether expanding accreditation pathways will meaningfully improve access to legal education without sacrificing quality? This decision reflects a deliberate move away from a single national standard toward a more flexible regulatory framework.

The opinion emphasizes that this change is not a rejection of ABA-accreditation, rather, the Court frames its decision as a recalibration of authority. The new framework expands the definition of “accredited” to no longer exclusively correlate to the ABA.[x] The expanding on the amendment has two separate frameworks. First, it allows accreditation by any “programmatic accrediting agency recognized by the United States Department of Education to accredit programs in legal education that lead to the first professional degree in law.”[xi] Which is currently a category that only includes the ABA. Second, it permits accreditation by institutional accrediting agencies, provided those agencies are both federally recognized and approved by the Court.[xii] The latter option gives Florida the ability to impose its own conditions focused on outcomes, such as bar passage rates, employment disclosures, and curricular standards.[xiii]

For instance, the majority’s reasoning reflects concern about cost and access. Law school tuition is constantly increasing, and critics of the ABA accreditation process have long argued that compliance costs contribute to rising student debt. The United States Federal Trade Commission has called out the ABA for being a monopoly because it has increased the cost of earning a law degree, hindering the reservoir of new lawyers.[xiv] The ABA has historically been the only recognized law school accreditation in the nation, allowing for there to be only one distinct policy to adhere to.

However, Justice Labarga’s dissent highlights the risks inherent in departing from such a long-standing system.[xv] He emphasizes that the ABA has served as Florida’s sole accreditor since 1992 and has developed extensive expertise in evaluating legal education quality.[xvi] Justice Labarga also argues that the ABA standards provide consumer protection, transparency, and institutional accountability, features that may take years for any alternative accreditor to replicate.[xvii] The history behind the organization is a rather strong front, and this change will most likely not immediately pan out.

Nevertheless, the Court’s decision does not immediately transform Florida’s legal educational environment as the amendments take effect on October 1, 2026. Graduates of ABA-accredited schools remain fully eligible to sit for the Bar; the ruling creates a potential change rather than an immediate one, allowing for the proper development of the amendments. Whether this shift ultimately benefits aspiring lawyers and the public will depend on implementation. Texas and Florida stand as the catalysts for this movement, which can possibly lead to the erasure of the ABA’s monopoly on the law school atmosphere.

[i] Mark D. Killian & Samadhi Jones, The Florida Bar Timeline 1950–2025, Fla. Bar (Sep. 8, 2025), https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-news/the-florida-bar-timeline-1950-2025 (“In April 1950, the Florida Supreme Court entered an order officially creating The Florida Bar as an integrated (mandatory) bar, uniting all licensed attorneys in the state into a single professional organization responsible for regulating the practice of law.”).

[ii] Id.

[iii] See In Re Amends. to Rules Regulating Fla. Bar & Rules of Sup. Ct. Relating to Admissions to Bar, 51 Fla. L. Weekly 25 (2026).

[iv] Id.

[v] See id.; see also Liv Caputo, Florida Supreme Court Ends Three-Decade Reliance on ABA, Handing Win to DeSantis, Fla. Phoenix (Jan. 15, 2026, at 12:43 PM), https://floridaphoenix.com/2026/01/15/florida-supreme-court-ends-three-decade-reliance-on-aba-handing-win-to-desantis/.

[vi] See In Re Amends. to Rules Regulating Fla. Bar & Rules of Sup. Ct. Relating to Admissions to Bar, supra note iii.

[vii] See id.

[viii] Id.

[ix] Fla. Const. art. V, § 15.

[x] In Re Amends. to Rules Regulating Fla. Bar & Rules of Sup. Ct. Relating to Admissions to Bar, supra note iii.

[xi] Id.

[xii] Id.

[xiii] See id.

[xiv] See Chris Williams, FTC Blames High Law School Costs on ABA Accreditation, Above Law (Dec. 3, 2025, at 4:55 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2025/12/ftc-blames-high-law-school-costs-on-aba-accreditation/.

[xv] See In Re Amends. to Rules Regulating Fla. Bar & Rules of Sup. Ct. Relating to Admissions to Bar, 51 Fla. L. Weekly 25 (2026) (Labarga, J., dissenting).

[xvi] See id.

[xvii] Id.

Home Court Advantage: The Potential Rise of State Court Favoritism in NCAA Eligibility Litigation

Home Court Advantage: The Potential Rise of State Court Favoritism in NCAA Eligibility Litigation

In the prominent world of Name, Image, and Likeness (“NIL”) in collegiate athletics, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) has been involved in their fair share of litigation surrounding athletes requesting additional years of eligibility.  The most notable instance of the NCAA involved in litigation is against Trinidad Chambliss, the quarterback who led the University of Mississippi (“Ole Miss”) to their first College Football Playoff appearance in 2025-2026.[i]  Just a month ago, Chambliss was granted a favorable ruling by a trial court in Mississippi.[ii] But the NCAA is not only litigating claims against prominent athletes like Chambliss.

On March 6, 2026, Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the issuance of a preliminary injunction to Doctor Bradley (“Bradley”), a member of Bethune-Cookman University’s (“BCU”) basketball program.[iii]  BCU is the sixth university which Bradley has been enrolled in.[iv]  The most important information from these six years comes from Bradley’s penultimate college stop, as this is where the litigation against the NCAA stems from. While at Nicholls State University (“Nicholls State”) during the 2023-2024 season, Bradley opted to step away from the team amidst legal troubles he faced due to his involvement in a hazing incident at New Mexico State University (“NMSU”), the school he attended prior to Nicholls State.[v]  In a waiver filed to the NCAA by BCU on Bradley’s behalf, the school requested Bradley be granted an additional year of eligibility in part because he was denied an opportunity to play in the 2023-2024 season with Nicholls State due to circumstances beyond his own control.[vi] These circumstances were in reference to the hazing incident that Bradley was involved in.

The NCAA would deny the waiver request by finding there was no objective documentation that Bradley could not compete at Nicholls State for reasons that were beyond his control.[vii] The NCAA on reconsideration would further find that the 2023-2024 season was not a denied participation opportunity because Bradley decided himself to step away from the team, partially due to pending legal matters connected to the hazing incident.[viii] BCU would choose not to pursue any further appeals, and instead, Bradley would file a complaint against the NCAA.[ix] Bradley alleged that the NCAA was violating the Florida Antitrust Act by denying him a waiver to play with BCU, and sought to enjoin the NCAA from violating the Act.[x] Bradley also sought an order from the court declaring that he is entitled to play basketball for BCU for the 2025-2026 season.[xi]

The court below would grant Bradley’s temporary injunction on January 9, 2026, allowing him to join BCU for the remainder of the season.[xii] One of the main issues, according to the Fifth District, is that the lower court provided only a short two-paragraph analysis as to why Bradley was entitled to a temporary injunction.[xiii] The Fifth District noted the four elements necessary to establish a temporary injunction is warranted. They also provided Florida case law that states that a trial court must give clear, definite, and unequivocal sufficient factual findings to support each of the four elements.[xiv] The trial court’s two-paragraph analysis was obviously deficient to justify a temporary injunction, a remedy that is to be issued only in rare circumstances.[xv] The trail court’s order fell short due to its lack of sufficient factual findings for three of the temporary injunction elements while completely omitting to mention one of the elements entirely. Also mentioned was the fact that Bradley alleged a violation of the Florida Antitrust Act, a case that would be fact-intensive and surely garner more than two paragraphs of conclusory analysis.

This kind of favorable ruling for Bradley could spark an interesting conversation in that athletes may get more favorable rulings with local state court judges. For example, the previously mentioned Chambliss received a favorable ruling allowing him to play in a sixth year of college football after previously being denied additional eligibility. The judge who presides over Chambliss’ case, Judge Robert Whitwell, graduated from Ole Miss law,[xvi] and it could be argued that he subjectively might like to see Chambliss back with the Rebels because of his athletic abilities. In fact, Chambliss’ lawyers likely strategically filed in Mississippi state court.[xvii] There is no indication that the judge presiding over Bradley’s case, Judge Dennis Craig, is affiliated with BCU in any way. However, it could be argued that he would want to possibly see his local Division I college basketball team benefit from a veteran like Bradley playing. Issuing a conclusory and fact deficient order granted a precious remedy like a temporary injunction certainly can serve as circumstantial evidence that the filing in state courts is much more favorable to the college athletes and the NCAA would have to rely on the appellate court to correct orders such as the one entered in Bradley’s case.

[i] Pete Thamel, Ole Miss QB Trinidad Chambliss granted injunction for 2026, ESPN (Feb. 12, 2026 6:18 ET), https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/47912898/ole-miss-qb-trinidad-chambliss-granted-injunction-judge.

[ii] Id.

[iii] See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bradley, No. 5D2026-0128, slip op. at 2 (Fla. 5th DCA Mar. 6, 2026).

[iv] Id.

[v] Id. (“Nicholls State University . . . where he transferred during the 2023-2024 season until Bradley left the team due to complications stemming from the hazing incident at NMSU”).

[vi] Id. at 3.

[vii] Id. at 4.

[viii] Id. at 4.

[ix] Bradley, slip op. at 4.

[x] Id.

[xi] Id.

[xii] Id.

[xiii] Id. at 4–5.

[xiv] See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610; see also Wayne’s Aggregate & Materials, LLC v. Lopez, 391 So. 3d 633, 636 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024).

[xv] See Bradley, slip op. at 6; see also Blue Earth Sols. V. Fla. Consol. Props., LLC, 113 So. 3d 991, 992 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (“A mandatory injunction should be issued in only the rarest of circumstances where the rights are clear and certain.”).

[xvi] Caleb Salers, Attorneys representing Ole Miss QB Chambliss sue NCAA for sixth year of eligibility, Super Talk Miss. Media (Jan. 16, 2026), https://www.supertalk.fm/attorneys-representing-ole-miss-qb-chambliss-sue-ncaa-for-sixth-year-of-eligibility/ (“The judge overseeing Chambliss’ case is Senatobia native Robert Whitwell, an Ole Miss Law graduate and former Northwest Mississippi Community College Quarterback.”).

[xvii] Thamel, supra note 1 (“The case was heard in a state court, which was a strategic decision by Chambliss’ lawyers when they filed for the injunction last month.”).

Florida Court Reaffirms Strict Gatekeeping Standard for Punitive Damages

Florida Court Reaffirms Strict Gatekeeping Standard for Punitive Damages

Motor vehicle negligence cases account for a large portion of personal injury litigation, yet punitive damages are rarely permitted unless there is sufficient supporting evidence.[i] Florida law imposes strict procedural and evidentiary requirements; under Florida Statutes section 768.72, a plaintiff may not plead punitive damages without demonstrating “clear and convincing evidence” that the defendant was engaged in “intentional misconduct or gross negligence.”[ii] Gross negligence is defined as conduct “so reckless or wanting in care that it constitute[s] a conscious disregard or indifference to the life, safety, or rights of persons exposed to such conduct.”[iii]

The Sixth District Court of Appeal recently applied these principles in Sagastume Mirlalda v. Mitchell, a decision that highlights the narrow circumstances in which punitive damages may be asserted in negligence cases.[iv] Here, the court addressed whether the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to assert punitive damages against both the driver and his employer companies. The appellate court ultimately reversed the trial court’s order, concluding that the plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable evidentiary basis for punitive damages under section 768.72.[v]

Sagastume worked for a concrete company that operated pump trailers on construction sites. While driving through a construction area, a pipe attached to his trailer became unsecured and struck another worker, Stafford Mitchell, causing injuries. Mitchell sued Sagastume and the company entities for negligence. In his motion for leave for punitive damages, Mitchell argued Sagastume’s conduct was grossly negligent because Sagastume had a history of driver’s license suspensions, was driving with an expired license at the time of the accident, and had allegedly been involved in a similar incident two days earlier. Mitchell also sought punitive damages against the employer entities based on negligent hiring, retention, and supervision.

The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Sagastume demonstrated willful and wanton conduct sufficient to support punitive damages. The court further determined that the employer could face both vicarious and direct punitive liability. The Sixth District disagreed, emphasizing that punitive damages are reserved for “truly culpable behavior” that would cause an average member of the community to exclaim, “Outrageous!”

First, the court rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on Sagastume’s prior driving history. Because these suspensions were unrelated to reckless driving or dangerous conduct, the court concluded that they were irrelevant to determining whether Sagastume acted with gross negligence on the day of the accident. Second, the court determined that Sagastume’s expired driver’s license did not support punitive damages. Although driving with an expired license may violate traffic laws, the court explained that such a violation does not establish gross negligence. Finally, the court found the accident two days earlier could not support punitive damages because the record contained no evidence explaining what caused that incident, and, therefore, could not establish that Sagastume acted recklessly in the accident at issue.

For these reasons, the appellate court also rejected the plaintiff’s theory of vicarious liability against the employer. Florida law requires proof an employee engaged in intentional misconduct or gross negligence before punitive damages may be imposed on the employer.[vii] The court also rejected direct liability against the employer. Because Sagastume had originally been hired as a mechanic and only later transferred to a driver position, the court concluded the plaintiff failed to present evidence showing that the managers acted with willful or malicious conduct when hiring and supervising Sagastume.

This decision reinforces Florida courts’ strict approach to punitive damages and clarifies that a defendant’s driving history is insufficient to support punitive damages unless it is directly connected to the conduct that caused the plaintiff’s injury. This case highlights the importance of demonstrating a clear nexus between the defendant’s prior conduct and the alleged misconduct at issue; administrative violations or unrelated driving infractions will rarely satisfy Florida’s demanding gross negligence standard. This decision also provides strong defense grounds to challenge punitive damages claims that rely on generalized character evidence rather than conduct that demonstrates a conscious disregard for public safety.

[i] See When Can You Seek Punitive Damages for an Auto Accident in Florida?, JD Supra (Nov. 17, 2025), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/when-can-you-seek-punitive-damages-for-5002110/.

[ii] Fla. Stat. § 768.72 (1–2) (2024).

[iii] Fla. Stat. § 768.72 (2)(b) (2024).

[iv] Sagastume Mirlalda v. Mitchell, No. 6D2025-0451, 2026 WL 547765 (Fla. 6th DCA Feb. 27, 2026).

[v] Id.

[vi] Id.

[vii] Fla. Stat. § 768.72(3) (2024).

Moot Court Resume 2026

Moot Court Resume

St. Thomas University College of Law

Moot Court Honor Society

16401 N.W. 37th Ave. | Miami Gardens, Florida 33054

Tel: 305.628.6536

Email: mootcourt@stu.edu

Moot Court Competitions / Honors/ Awards

Notable Honors/Awards

  • Finalist – 2026 – Robert Orseck Moot Court Competition
  • Best Brief Award – 2026 – Robert Orseck Moot Court Competition
  • Semi-Finalist – 2026 – Jerome Prince Memorial Evidence Competition
  • Best Petitioner’s Brief Award – 2026 – John J. Gibbons Moot Court Competition
  • Finalist – 2026 – John J. Gibbons Moot Court Competition
  • Best Brief Award – 2026 – John J. Gibbons Moot Court Competition
  • Semi-Finalist – 2026 – Uvaldo Herrera National Moot Court Competition
  • Best Brief Award – 2026 – Uvaldo Herrera National Moot Court Competition
  • Best Brief Award – 2025 – Chicago Bar Association Moot Court Competition
  • Semi-Finalist – 2025 – Chicago Bar Association Moot Court Competition
  • Octo-Finalist – 2025 – San Diego National Criminal Procedure Competition
  • Best Brief Award – 2024 – Chicago Bar Association Moot Court Competition
  • Quarter-Finalist – 2024 – Chicago Bar Association Moot Court Competition
  • Octo-Finalist – 2024 – San Diego National Criminal Procedure Competition
  • National Finalist – 2024 – Uvaldo Herrera National Moot Court Competition
  • Top Brief Award – 2024 – Uvaldo Herrera National Moot Court Competition
  • Octo-Finalist – 2023 – Chicago Bar Association Moot Court Competition
  • Octo-Finalist – 2023 – San Diego National Criminal Procedure Competition
  • Quarter-Finalist – 2023 Jerome Prince Memorial Evidence Competition
  • Semi-Finalist – 2022 Robert Orseck Memorial Moot Court Competition
  • Octo-Finalist – 2021 Emory Civil Rights Moot Court Competition
  • Top Brief Award – 2021 Emory Civil Rights Moot Court Competition
  • First Runner Up Brief Award – 2019 National Tax Moot Court Competition
  • Best Brief Award – 2016 John J. Gibbons Moot Court Competition
  • Octo-Finalist – 2016 John J. Gibbons Moot Court Competition
  • Best Brief Award – 2011 San Diego National Criminal Procedure Competition
  • Octo-Finalist – 2011 San Diego National Criminal Procedure Competition
  • Semi-Finalist – 2009 John J. Gibbons Moot Court Competition (3/38 teams)
  • Quarter-Finalist – 2009 Thurgood Marshall Memorial Moot Court Competition
  • Second Best Overall Oralist – 2009 Thurgood Marshall Moot Court Competition
  • Octo-Finalist – 2008 Gabrielli National Family Law Moot Court Competition
  • Champion / Finalist – 2008 Robert Orseck Memorial Moot Court Competition

Academic Year 2025 – 2026

           2026 Robert Orseck Moot Court Competition

           2026 Uvaldo Herrera National Moot Court Competition

           2026 John J. Gibbons Moot Court Competition

           2026 Jerome Prince Memorial Evidence Competition

           2025 National Criminal Procedure Tournament

           2025 Wechsler National First Amendment Moot Court Competition

           2025 Chicago Bar Association Moot Court Competition

Academic Year 2024 – 2025

2025 National Tax Moot Court Competition

2025 Uvaldo Herrera National Moot Court Competition

2025 Tulane University Law School Moot Court Invitational

2024 Chicago Bar Association Moot Court Competition

2024 San Diego National Criminal Procedure Competition

2024 Emory Civil Rights & Liberties Moot Court Competition

Academic Year 2023 – 2024

2024 Robert Orseck Memorial Moot Court Competition

2024 Uvaldo Herrera National Moot Court Competition

2024 John J. Gibbons Moot Court Competition

2024 Jerome Prince Memorial Evidence Competition

2023 Chicago Bar Association Moot Court Competition

2023 San Diego National Criminal Procedure Competition

Academic Year 2022 – 2023

2023 Jerome Prince Memorial Evidence Competition

2023 John J. Gibbons Moot Court Competition

2023 Thurgood Marshall Memorial Moot Court Competition

2022 Robert Orseck Memorial Moot Court Competition

2022 Earle E. Zehmer Competition

2022 Emory Civil Rights & Liberties Moot Court Competition

2022 San Diego National Criminal Procedure Competition

2022 Wechsler National First Amendment Moot Court Competition

Academic Year 2021 – 2022

2022 Jerome Prince Memorial Evidence Competition

2022 Seigenthaler-Sutherland Cup National First Amendment Moot Court Competition

2022 ABA Law Student Division National Appellate Advocacy Competition

2022 Saul Lefkowitz Trademark Competition

2021 Robert Orseck Memorial Moot Court Competition

2021 The New York City Bar National Moot Court Competition

2021 Wechsler First Amendment Moot Court Competition

2021 Emory Civil Rights and Liberties Moot Court Competition

2021 The William C. Vis International Commercial Arbitration Moot Court Competition

Academic Year 2020 – 2021

2021 National Appellate Advocacy Competition

2021 National Tax Moot Court Competition

2021 Jerome Prince Memorial Evidence Competition

2020 Robert Orseck Memorial Moot Court Competition

2020 Emory Civil Rights and Liberties Competition

2020 San Diego National Criminal Procedure Competition

2020 NYC Bar National Competition

Academic Year 2019 – 2020

2020 ABA National Appellate Advocacy Competition

2020 John J. Gibbons Moot Court Competition

2020 Jerome Prince Memorial Evidence Competition

2019 Robert Orseck Memorial Moot Court Competition

Academic Year 2018 – 2019

2019 Jerome Prince Memorial Evidence Competition

2019 National Tax Moot Court Competition

2018 Robert Orseck Memorial Moot Court Competition

Academic Year 2017 – 2018

2018 Jerome Prince Memorial Evidence Competition

2018 John J. Gibbons National Criminal Procedure Moot Court Competition

2017 Robert Orseck Memorial Moot Court Competition

2017 San Diego National Criminal Procedure Competition

2017 Wechsler Moot Court Competition

Academic Year 2016 – 2017

2017 Jerome Prince Memorial Evidence Competition

2017 ABA Law Student Division National Appellate Advocacy Competition

2016 Robert Orseck Memorial Moot Court Competition

2016 Weschler Moot Court Competition

Academic Year 2015 – 2016

2016 John J. Gibbons Moot Court Competition

2016 Jerome Prince Memorial Evidence Competition

2016 ABA Law Student Division National Appellate Advocacy Competition

2016 Uvaldo Herrera National Moot Court Competition

2015 Puerto Rican Bar Association

2015 Earle E. Zehmer Competition

2015 San Diego National Criminal Procedure Competition

2015 Wechsler National First Amendment Moot Court Competition

Academic Year 2014 – 2015

2015 John J. Gibbons Moot Court Competition

2015 Jerome Prince Memorial Evidence Competition

2015 ABA Law Student Division National Appellate Advocacy Competition

2015 Duberstein Bankruptcy Moot Court Competition

2015 Frederick Douglass Moot Court Competition

2015 Robert Orseck Memorial Moot Court Competition

2014 Earle E. Zehmer Competition

2014 Wechsler National First Amendment Moot Court Competition

Academic Year 2013 – 2014

2014 John J. Gibbons Moot Court Competition

2014 ABA Law Student Division National Appellate Advocacy Competition

2014 Duberstein Bankruptcy Moot Court Competition

2014 Frederick Douglass Moot Court Competition

2014 The Tulane Mardi Gras Sports Law Competition

2014 Robert Orseck Memorial Moot Court Competition

2013 San Diego National Criminal Procedure Competition

2013 Wechsler National First Amendment Moot Court Competition

2013 The Jeffrey G. Miller National Environmental Law Moot Court Competition

Academic Year 2012 – 2013

2013 ABA Law Student Division National Appellate Advocacy Competition

2013 Duberstein Bankruptcy Moot Court Competition

2013 Jeffrey G. Miller National Environmental Law Competition

2013 Jerome Prince Memorial Evidence Competition

2013 John J. Gibbons Moot Court Competition

2012 Wechsler National First Amendment Moot Court Competition

2012 Robert Orseck Memorial Moot Court Competition

Academic Year 2011 ­– 2012

2012 Thurgood Marshall Memorial Moot Court Competition

2012 John J. Gibbons Moot Court Competition

2012 ABA Law Student Division National Appellate Advocacy Competition

2012 Frederick Douglass Moot Court Competition

2011 San Diego National Criminal Procedure Competition

2011 Wechsler National First Amendment Moot Court Competition

2011 Robert Orseck Memorial Moot Court Competition

Academic Year 2010 – 2011

2011 John J. Gibbons Moot Court Competition

2011 ABA Law Student Division National Appellate Advocacy Competition

2010 Wechsler National First Amendment Moot Court Competition

Academic Year 2009 – 2010

2010 ABA Law Student Division National Appellate Advocacy Competition

2010 John J. Gibbons Moot Court Competition

2009 San Diego National Criminal Procedure Competition

Academic Year 2008 – 2009

2009 John J. Gibbons Moot Court Competition

2009 Thurgood Marshall Memorial Moot Court Competition

2008 Wechsler National First Amendment Moot Court Competition

Academic Year 2007 – 2008

2009 John J. Gibbons Moot Court Competition

2008 Domenick L. Gabrielli National Family Law Moot Court Competition

2008 Robert Orseck Memorial Moot Court Competition

Authenticating AI Evidence in Florida: Closing the Gaps

Authentication is the foundation of admissibility. Under § 90.901, evidence must be authenticated or identified before it can be admitted, a requirement satisfied by showing enough proof that the evidence is what the proponent claims it to be.[i] In Florida, this threshold is relatively low. Courts allow authentication through a variety of means, including appearance, content, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, either supported by extrinsic proof or through self-authentication. However, the rise of artificial intelligence (“AI”) poses new challenges to this framework. AI-generated content can appear highly convincing while bearing no connection to reality. Without stronger safeguards, courts risk admitting unreliable AI-based evidence that slips through under the current low bar.

Florida courts are finding ways to deal with digital evidence by adapting old rules to new technology, but they also make sure not to weaken important protections like authentication, privacy, and fairness in the process. Florida’s Evidence Code § 90.901 requires that evidence be supported by proof sufficient to show that it is what its proponent claims, and courts have applied this requirement with notable flexibility. In Lamb v. State, the Fourth DCA upheld the admission of a Facebook Live video authenticated through forensic testimony, reflecting the judiciary’s willingness to admit digital content when properly connected to its source.[ii] Similarly, in Tracey v. State, the Florida Supreme Court required warrants for cell-site location data, adapting constitutional protections to the realities of digital surveillance.[iii]Additionally, in Wilsonart, LLC v. Lopez, while the Court declined to create a narrow exception for video evidence, it signaled its intent to adopt the federal Celotex summary judgment standard.[iv] An intent later formalized in the amendment of Rule 1.510, reshaped Florida’s summary judgment practice giving judges greater authority to grant judgment when one side has no real evidence.[v] Taken together, these decisions illustrate how Florida courts balance adaptability with restraint, extending established doctrines to address digital evidence without undermining the foundational protections of authentication, privacy, and procedural fairness.

Even with safeguards, authentication is vulnerable. Parties are not required to disclose whether evidence is AI generated and contextual markers like metadata can be fabricated. Proprietary algorithms may avoid Daubert review if methods are withheld (e.g., facial recognition software). Unlike federal courts, Florida lacks self-authentication rules for electronic records, forcing reliance on live testimony for even routine digital files.[vi]

The judiciary has already flagged AI concerns. In 2023, the Office of the State Courts Administrator warned that deepfakes and synthetic media could strain authentication standards. Florida’s 2025 procedural reforms, such as proportional discovery[vii], revised summary-judgment timelines[viii], and the Supreme Court’s ongoing review of Evidence Code amendments (SC2025-0659) create an opening to confront AI’s impact directly.[ix]

Florida can act before AI evidence overwhelms its courts. While Florida Statute § 90.901, Daubert, and contextual proof offer a baseline, stricter disclosure and reliability rules in the pending Evidence Code amendments are needed to keep synthetic evidence out of the record.

[i] Fla. Stat. § 90.901 (2025).

[ii] Lamb v. State, 246 So. 3d 400, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).

[iii] Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2014).

[iv] Wilsonart, LLC v. Lopez, 308 So. 3d 961 (Fla. 2020); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).

[v] See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510 (2025).

[vi] See Fed. R. Evid. 902(13)–(14); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (allowing judges act as evidentiary gatekeepers grounded in scientifically valid methodology as demonstrated through factors like testability, peer review, error rates, standards, and general acceptance).

[vii] Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280 (2025)

[viii] Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510 (2025)

[ix] In re Amends. to the Fla. Evidence Code § 90.404(2)(c), No. SC2025-0659 (proposed Apr. 2025).