Authenticating AI Evidence in Florida: Closing the Gaps

Authentication is the foundation of admissibility. Under § 90.901, evidence must be authenticated or identified before it can be admitted, a requirement satisfied by showing enough proof that the evidence is what the proponent claims it to be.[i] In Florida, this threshold is relatively low. Courts allow authentication through a variety of means, including appearance, content, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, either supported by extrinsic proof or through self-authentication. However, the rise of artificial intelligence (“AI”) poses new challenges to this framework. AI-generated content can appear highly convincing while bearing no connection to reality. Without stronger safeguards, courts risk admitting unreliable AI-based evidence that slips through under the current low bar.

Florida courts are finding ways to deal with digital evidence by adapting old rules to new technology, but they also make sure not to weaken important protections like authentication, privacy, and fairness in the process. Florida’s Evidence Code § 90.901 requires that evidence be supported by proof sufficient to show that it is what its proponent claims, and courts have applied this requirement with notable flexibility. In Lamb v. State, the Fourth DCA upheld the admission of a Facebook Live video authenticated through forensic testimony, reflecting the judiciary’s willingness to admit digital content when properly connected to its source.[ii] Similarly, in Tracey v. State, the Florida Supreme Court required warrants for cell-site location data, adapting constitutional protections to the realities of digital surveillance.[iii]Additionally, in Wilsonart, LLC v. Lopez, while the Court declined to create a narrow exception for video evidence, it signaled its intent to adopt the federal Celotex summary judgment standard.[iv] An intent later formalized in the amendment of Rule 1.510, reshaped Florida’s summary judgment practice giving judges greater authority to grant judgment when one side has no real evidence.[v] Taken together, these decisions illustrate how Florida courts balance adaptability with restraint, extending established doctrines to address digital evidence without undermining the foundational protections of authentication, privacy, and procedural fairness.

Even with safeguards, authentication is vulnerable. Parties are not required to disclose whether evidence is AI generated and contextual markers like metadata can be fabricated. Proprietary algorithms may avoid Daubert review if methods are withheld (e.g., facial recognition software). Unlike federal courts, Florida lacks self-authentication rules for electronic records, forcing reliance on live testimony for even routine digital files.[vi]

The judiciary has already flagged AI concerns. In 2023, the Office of the State Courts Administrator warned that deepfakes and synthetic media could strain authentication standards. Florida’s 2025 procedural reforms, such as proportional discovery[vii], revised summary-judgment timelines[viii], and the Supreme Court’s ongoing review of Evidence Code amendments (SC2025-0659) create an opening to confront AI’s impact directly.[ix]

Florida can act before AI evidence overwhelms its courts. While Florida Statute § 90.901, Daubert, and contextual proof offer a baseline, stricter disclosure and reliability rules in the pending Evidence Code amendments are needed to keep synthetic evidence out of the record.

[i] Fla. Stat. § 90.901 (2025).

[ii] Lamb v. State, 246 So. 3d 400, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).

[iii] Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2014).

[iv] Wilsonart, LLC v. Lopez, 308 So. 3d 961 (Fla. 2020); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).

[v] See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510 (2025).

[vi] See Fed. R. Evid. 902(13)–(14); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (allowing judges act as evidentiary gatekeepers grounded in scientifically valid methodology as demonstrated through factors like testability, peer review, error rates, standards, and general acceptance).

[vii] Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280 (2025)

[viii] Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510 (2025)

[ix] In re Amends. to the Fla. Evidence Code § 90.404(2)(c), No. SC2025-0659 (proposed Apr. 2025).

Prospective Plaintiff Denied Pursuant to Florida Pre-Suit Requirements Under Chapter 766 in Recent District Court of Appeals Decision

Prospective Plaintiff Denied Pursuant to Florida Pre-Suit Requirements Under Chapter 766 in Recent District Court of Appeals Decision

One detail missed, several lives affected. Despite the harm that can result from medical misconduct, it is not as easy for prospective plaintiffs to file a medical negligence claim. First, a claimant must complete an adequate pre-suit investigation prior to filing the complaint in Court. The statutory safeguard confirms the prospective plaintiff’s claim is supported by reasonable grounds. The required investigation includes: (1) a notice of intent to initiate litigation; and (2) a corroborating affidavit written by a medical expert in a similar field as the defendant health care provider.

 In a recent case, the Fourth District Court of Appeals opined that a proper corroborating affidavit is a “low bar.”[i]As such, the penalties for failing to conduct an adequate pre-suit investigation have severe consequences commanded by the statute. The court shall dismiss the claim if the notice of intent to initiate litigation is inadequate.[ii]  Additionally, the person who mailed such notice, either the claimant or the claimant’s attorney, would be personally liable for all attorneys’ fees and costs incurred during the investigation and evaluation of the claim.  A motion to dismiss would raise the issue of whether the corroborating affidavit is sufficient for a legitimate claim of medical negligence.[iii]

In Potapric v. Barnes, the Court dismissed a medical negligence claim for failing to comply with the statutory pre-suit requirements.[iv] Following alleged post-surgical complications, Barnes sued Dr. Potparic for medical negligence. Barnes’ expert affidavit stated Potparic violated the medical standard of care by performing the surgery while not properly registered with the Florida Department of Health. The affidavit mentioned a breach also where the nurse administered anesthesia while the supervising doctor was not properly registered. Discovery later revealed that Potparic was properly registered at the time of the surgery, and Barnes sought leave to file a second amended complaint. Barnes now alleged she was harmed because the nurse who administered the anesthesia was not properly registered with the Department of Health. However, Barnes did not submit a new affidavit with the second amended complaint. The affidavit did not mention the nurse’s own registration or describe any deficient act or how such act caused Barnes to have any injury.

The court looked at whether the notice of intent to initiate litigation and the corroborating expert opinion, taken together sufficiently indicated that Dr. Potparic allegedly deviated from the standard of care, and if Barnes provided adequate information for the defendants to evaluate the merits of the claim.[v] The Court agreed with Potparic that the affidavit does not corroborate reasonable grounds to support the claim of medical negligence set out in the second amended complaint. The only theory of negligence described in the claimant’s expert’s affidavit proved unfounded and was abandoned. The affidavit lent no support to the claim alleged in Barnes’s second amended complaint. Because Barnes failed to comply with the procedural requirements, the Court quashed the order denying dismissal with directions to grant the dismissal as commanded by statute. Along with dismissal, either Barnes or her attorney will be personally liable for the attorney’s fees and costs associated with investigating this claim.[vi]

While the District Court opinion did not reach the issue of consequences for failing to conduct a reasonable investigation, the statute commands liability for attorney’s fees and costs and disciplinary review with the Florida Bar.[vii]

[i] Potparic v. Barnes, No. 4D2025-1701, 2025 Fla. App. LEXIS 7301, at *6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sep. 24, 2025).

[ii] Fla. Stat. § 766.206(2) (2025).

[iii] Id.

[iv] Potparic v. Barnes, No. 4D2025-1701, 2025 Fla. App. LEXIS 7301, at *6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sep. 24, 2025).

[v] Id. at *5.

[vi] See Fla. Stat. §766.206(2)(2025).

[vii] Fla. Stat. § 766.206 (4).